Rabbi Moshe Reiss
The Israeli
- Palestinian conflict: Part G
A Two State
Solution: Election Day!
A Two State
Solution:
By initiating the Olso process Israel
stated its clear intention of negotiating and reaching a two-state
solution. A
two state solution must include a contiguous Palestinian state.
President Bush declared in April 2004
when he approved the Gaza disengagement
plan
that the right of return was a nonstarter and that the large settlement
blocs
near Jerusalem would remain in the
hands of Israel.
The Palestinians have not accepted either of Bush’s statements which
were also
rejected at Camp David in 2000.
The
Israeli occupation of Palestinians must end for
moral, demographic and political reasons. It endangers Israel’s
existence as a Jewish and
democratic state. (When 30-40% of the population living between the
Jordan
River and the Mediterranean Sea
cannot due to
religion or nationality – the Palestinians - become citizens they are
being
occupied. That is why the Gaza
withdrawal ended that part of the occupation.) A democratic state
cannot be an
occupying power. In addition Israel’s
security situation must be strengthened. Whatever strategies are used
to reduce
the occupation they must reduce the security threat as well.
Are the majority of Palestinians committed
to this two state solution? Is Hamas? Recently the Hamas leader on the
West
Bank, Sheik Hassan Yussef, declared that the group would consider an
indefinite
‘hudna’ - or pause in armed conflict. The ‘hudna’ meant that both sides
in the ongoing
conflict could live in safety and peace as long as it lasts, and that
it could
even be extended indefinitely. ‘We can dream about all Palestine being
Muslim -
like some Israelis dream of a Greater Israel that includes all our
lands - but
it is not practical,’ he said.
The two state solution requires
addressing Israel’s
security
problem, the Jerusalem
issue and Palestinian Refugee problem.
Security:
Israeli’s security must obviously be
considered in the final border decisions. This includes among others
the Jordan Valley
and the Golan Heights. The Jordan Valley,
Israel’s eastern
border with
the Hashemite Kingdom,
given the Hamas victory, the chaos enveloping Shia Iraq
and the very real possibility of the Shia nuclear armed Iran
make this border more
problematical than previous. The Golan Heights taken from Syria
given the current status of
that country and its government are clearly an Israeli security problem.
Syria and Iran have had a long term axis; they
share
common interests in Iraq
where they have cooperated due to their mutual antipathy toward the Israel and United States. Damascus
believes that by cooperating with Iran
it can stave off international pressure while expanding its freedom of
action
in Lebanon and Israel.
Both countries helped create and fund Hizbollah beginning in the
1980’s. In
January of 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad traveled to Damascus in order
to
cement ties between the two increasingly isolated countries.
Despite
this Damascus tells the United States and Israel that if its
government is
removed from power, Islamists will be waiting to take power. In fact, Damascus has
feverishly
attempted to depict itself as a victim of radical Islamic militancy to
counter
charges that it promotes such activity, and has more or less staged
clashes
between Syrian security forces and militants to prove the point.
Damascus works rather
transparently to maintain Lebanon
in an ongoing state of instability; a state to which Lebanon
is certainly accustomed. Saudi Arabia,
another neighbor anxiously fears
that Damascus
may attempt to destabilize the Saudi peninsula if pushed too far.
In the West Bank
the settlements were once considered part of
the security strategy; the IDF Planning Branch no longer consider that
the
case. According to Haaretz correspondent Aluf Benn “The general view in
the
defense establishment is that settlements do not contribute directly to
security and also force the IDF to deploy troops for their defense”
(March
6). This referred to isolated
settlements and was not intended to include the major settlement blocs
near Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and the Golan.
This new strategy uncouples settlement activity from security
considerations.
The result at least temporarily will be the equivalent of the
Bantustans of South
Africa.
This may be the best that can be Israel can do given the
current
interim strategic solutions. It does however contradict the long term
two state
solution.
Jerusalem:
The two state solution requires the
State of Palestine to have a capital in
Eastern
Jerusalem; without Jerusalem
a two state solution does not exist. This capitol must be connected to
the West Bank. Unfortunately Israel
planning for the security fence and building Jewish neighborhoods
surrounding Jerusalem
are undermining
that connection. The expansion of Ma’aleh Adumim (the E1) and the
creation of
new Jewish neighborhoods at the perimeter of the municipal boundaries
would
create a Jewish belt around Arab East Jerusalem, cutting it off from
the West Bank and constricting
Palestinian growth within the
city. A majority of Israelis are willing to give up on East Jerusalem
even
without a peace treaty; excluding the Old City.
95% believe a Jewish Jerusalem
is important. The only way to achieve that is give Arab Jerusalem to the
Palestinians. (Tazpit
Research Institute for the Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies, Haaretz and Jerusalem
Post, Jan. 19)
East Jerusalem cannot be separated from
the West Bank if there is to be a satisfactory two state solution.
There are approximately 250,000
Palestinians in Jerusalem;
the fence has 80% on the Israeli side. When the fence is completed,
some
200,000 Palestinian East Jerusalemites will end up inside Jewish
Jerusalem,
live under Israeli control, and increasingly be separated from the West
Bank;
the remaining 50,000 will be outside the barrier, disconnected from the
city
that has been their centre of gravity, fearful of reduced social
services and,
in many instances, determined to find their way back into the fenced-in
areas.
Does this increase Israeli security or lessen it? "In fact, it will
undermine it, weakening Palestinian pragmatists, by incorporating
hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians on the Israeli side of the fence, and sowing
the
seeds of growing radicalism". Mouin
Rabbani, a senior ICG analyst, said it could become easier for militant
groups
to recruit Palestinians from Jerusalem
to carry out attacks as resentment and hardship rose. (International
Crisis
Group, August 2, 2005). Is a Greater Jerusalem
ideology replacing the Greater Israel
thesis?
At some point the Arabs in Jerusalem who
have nearly
40 percent of the city's population, may vote in a municipal election.
They
have thus far chosen to boycott Jerusalem
municipal elections. Israel's
Jerusalem is in danger of being taken
over
legally - perhaps in coalition with Jerusalem's
anti-Zionist ultra orthodox Jews.
Jerusalem is the true epicenter of
the
Palestinian Israeli conflict. It is difficult, although not impossible
to see
any near or even mid term solution to the Jerusalem
old city problem.
Ruth Lapidoth (retired Professor of
International Law at the Hebrew University) recently heading a team of
experts
under the auspices of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS)
laid
out five options for the division of Jerusalem. Most require
international
involvement in administration of the Old City,
in the areas of
security, preservation and supervision of the holy places. The new
report
states: "It is especially complicated to plan and put into place a
special
regime for the historic basin, but it may be assumed that there is no
other
solution that could gain the agreement of the two sides and of the
international community”. It requires concentrating on our commonality
and not
our differences!
This Israeli growth plan is at war with
the two state solution. This will vastly complicate future attempts to
resolve
the conflict by both preventing the establishment of a viable
Palestinian
capital in Arab East Jerusalem and
obstructing
the territorial contiguity of a Palestinian state.
Palestinian
Refugees:
Many Palestinians live as "refugees",
primarily the descendants of original 1948 and 1967 War refugees. They
include
450,000 in Lebanon,
275,000
in Syria and
uncounted
hundreds of thousands in Jordan.
There is No possibility of Palestinian refugees moving into Israel
since that negates the two
state idea. And yet no significant Palestinian leader has had the
courage to
publicly state that. That problem can only be solved with some moving
to the
State of Palestine,
some being incorporated into the neighboring Arab states and some
monetary
compensation.
The
Economy:
The motto of Bill Clinton in his
election for presidency in 1992 was ‘it’s the economy, stupid’; this
applies
not only to America
but most of the world including Gaza and the West Bank. No one seems to
have a
solution to that problem. Young people are the pool of suicide bombers
– young
people have not seen life and therefore do not understand death. The
economic
situation is intricately with the security situation.
Prior to the disengagement the number
one priority for the Palestinian people was the end of occupation.
Today
according to Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for
Policy and
Survey Research their top priority now is for an improvement in the
economic life
in the Palestinian areas, with an end to political corruption, and an
end to
the occupation falling [in polls] far behind. “For the first time,
after the Gaza
disengagement, we
have economics coming on top… And the second one is in fact a virtual
tie between
fighting corruption and fighting occupation.”
How are the approximately 1.4 million
people
of Gaza Strip (49% under 14 years of
age) and
the West Bank approximate population
of 2
million (44% under 14 years of age) going
to survive? How will this young generation (too young even to vote)
react to
economic collapse and a humanitarian disaster? Is economic collapse
likely to
increase or decrease the level of terrorist attacks and Israeli counter
measures?
A decision to continue resistance will
force Hamas to abandon its domestic agenda. The two are incompatible.
Hamas's
domestic agenda necessitates a period of calm. To improve the quality
of life
and develop the social, economic, and political institutions, the
Palestinians need
calm and freedom of passage inside and between the West Bank and Gaza. The
Israelis need to
reduce the roadblocks on arteries and at key junctions. There is no way
a Hamas
Palestinian government can implement its plans without Israeli
cooperation.
The West Bank cities and the Gaza are
characterized by
different problems. As journalist Nicholas Jubber writes, ‘the Gaza
Strip and
the West Bank are divided by their unequal economies, distinct
dialects, and
cultural animosities forged by their pre-1967 experiences under
separate
regimes - Nasser's Egypt and King Hussein's Jordan.’ Socially,
West Bankers see themselves as the
upper echelon of Palestinian society; they are educated and had
financial
independence. However as a result of the second intifada both groups
now live
in poverty. With Hamas winning several of the municipal governments of
the West Bank major cities (aside
from the Palestinian
Legislative Council) political reform may be created. They ran on
correcting
the infrastructure and economy and improving education and health care
and
ending corruption.
Given the Hamas victory and Israeli’s
rightful distrust it may be that Gaza and the West Bank need to
continue to
develop separately. They have been developing separately for more than
a
decade. Perhaps Gaza can grow towards
El Arish,
that is Sinai’s Egypt.
That will have to be resolved between the Palestinians and Egypt,
a not likely event.
The idea of connecting Gaza and the
West Bank by some kind of a corridor: a surface or sunken highway or an
underground tunnel is no longer feasible given the Hamas victory. (The
Prime
Minister designate Ismail Hamiyah resides in Gaza
cannot go to the West Bank, his deputy Nassar al-Sha’er lives in the
West Bank
cannot go to Gaza.)
Since a single viable Palestinian state is no longer in the foreseeable
future
the separate development may be best for Israel’s security. One
hopes that
this can work particularly for the Gaza
population.
Conclusion:
Does anyone believe the final status
issues are ripe for resolution? The Labor Party appears to believe
negotiations
for peace are a viable option. The Likud’s position is to do nothing
and react.
Kadima platform is to act unilaterally. For the first time more
Israeli’s
believe the domestic problems are more important than the
Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. That may be the key to the election results.
If Kadima as likely becomes the largest
party in the Knesset its government will not seek a ‘peace partner’ but
an
‘interim coordination partner’ for the indefinite future. It is
intriguing that
is exactly what Hamas wants as well. Hamas is more realistic about the
short
and midterm future than Abbas. Both Kadima and Hamas recognize that
peace
negotiations are simply not in the foreseeable future.
The Kadima convergence plan is for
further disengagements in land with little settler population, all east
of the
fence but importantly and different than the Gaza disengagement there will be
continued
military occupation. This will not make for ‘final borders’ as claimed
by Ehud
Olmert. They will be recognized by no one. But they will allow Israel
more security and allow the logical growth of the main settler blocs. It is a towards ending the occupation.
The interim solution will not eliminate
Palestinian terrorism, but with the security fence and elimination of
outlying
settlements they will be significantly reduced. 80% of the settlers
reside in
large settlements near the Green line and are effectively being annexed
to Israel.
Israel
given the likely election results has (in what Netanyahu himself called
a
‘referendum’) chosen.
No one knows how the $190 million per
month necessary to fund the Palestinian budget will be met. Two thirds
of the
Palestinian economy is dependant on foreign aid. It is obvious that a
significant cut in this funding will result in a humanitarian disaster.
The U.S.
and E.U. provide more than half of budget. The Arab League who have so
far
refused to increase their $50 million contribution; they will be
meeting March
27-29.
Shaul Mofaz, Israeli Minister of
Defense has called the Prime Minister designate Haniyeh and Foreign
Minister
designate Mahmoud Azhar as terrorists with Jewish bloods on their
hands; will
he have them assassinated? How Israel
will coordinate with Hamas and Abbas (whose administrative powers seem
to be
growing almost daily) and the new government and how they will respond
to the
international community is unknown. What is clear is that the realities
of
governing contradict violence and terrorism. One can only hope that the
cease
fire will continue and then dialogue in small measures will begin to
take
place.