Turkish American Relations:
The Grand National Assembly's failure to allow American troops to use Turkish territory to conduct military operations on Iraq was a watershed event in Turkish-American relations. It did not occur in isolation, though, but rather was the result of diplomatic and political errors and miscalculations on both sides.
Turkey and the United States have for more than half a century enjoyed
a special relationship. Turkish troops fought alongside Americans in
the Korean War. As one of only two North Atlantic Treaty Organization
members to border the Soviet Union, Turkey truly was a frontline state
throughout the Cold War. In the wake of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, the Turkish government reaffirmed its alliance.
Within a month, the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted 319-101 to
send troops to Afghanistan to assist the United States in its Global
War on Terror.
Three years later, U.S.-Turkish ties are in disarray. In December 2004,
Mehmet Elkatm??, head of the Turkish Parliament Human Rights
Commission, accused the United States of "conducting genocide in Iraq."
Faruk Anbarc?o?lu, a Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk?nma
Partisi, AKP) deputy, suggested the dissolution of the Grand National
Assembly's Turkish-American Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group
An opinion article entitled "The Sick Man of Europe—Again" examining
Turkish anti-Americanism sent shockwaves through Turkish
intelligentsia, both because of its sharp tone and because of its
publication in The Wall Street Journal, a conservative daily generally
supportive of both the George W. Bush administration and U.S.-Turkish
relations. (Feb. 16, 2005).
When on March 1, 2003 the majority of Grand National Assembly
(Parliament) those present voted in favor of the motion, the Speaker
ruled that the motion failed because, considering the 19 abstentions,
the majority did not vote in favor of the U.S. deployment.
One reason was according to a number of Iraqi Kurdish businessmen and
politicians, that the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani
encouraged—sometimes financially—AKP deputies from southeastern Turkey
to vote against the war so as to undercut the possibility of Turkish
forces entering his territory
American Diplomacy has not helped. Secretary of State Colin Powell's
failure to visit Turkey in late 2002 and early 2003—while he found time
to fly to Angola, Cape Verde, and Columbia—was indicative of the
failure in American public diplomacy under Powell.
The Iraqi Turkmen Problem:
Three million Turkmen live in Iraq. These Turkish-speaking Iraqis were traditionally, alongside the Iraqi Jewish community, the country's business, professional elite, and during Ottoman times, political elite.
Following the 1991 uprising and the establishment of the northern Iraqi safe-haven, several Turkmen groups coalesced into the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). While the ITF was initially independent of the Turkish government, by 1996, former officials like founder Muzaffar Arslan left the group, complaining of increasingly heavy-handed Turkish military and intelligence interference.
The Turkmen issue plagued U.S.-Turkish relations following the
overthrow of Saddam's regime. Simply put, most Iraqi Turkmen—and
especially those who were Shi‘ite— refused the ITF's representation,
which they considered biased toward the Sunni community and more
concerned with the Turkish constituency than the Iraqi constituency.
When the [Iraqi] ‘Kurdistan Regional Government' distributed Kurdish
flags to residents of multi-ethnic towns like Tuuz and Daquq, many
Turkmen responded not by flying the pale blue and white ITF flag, but
rather the black, green, and red banners of the various Shi'ite groups.
The disproportionate attention of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and
General Staff upon the Turkmen undercut significantly Turkish influence
in Iraq. If Turkey could not be a military partner to the American
military in northern Iraq, then U.S. forces had little choice but to
increase their partnership with the Iraqi Kurdish militias. The Iraqi
Kurds embraced the U.S. soldiers. The Kurdistan Democratic Party in
particular showered American soldiers with lavish feasts, and bestowed
gifts like carpets and gold jewelry upon some commanding officers and
political officials who, unfortunately, accepted such favors. That
Kirkuk is now becoming an international flashpoint is a reflection not
only of the state of U.S.-Turkish relations, but also of two years of
Turkish policies which have undercut Ankara's influence in Iraq.
Turkey-Israel relations:
At first glance, Turkey and Israel could not be more different. Israel is small, predominantly Jewish and post-industrial state; Turkey is large, predominantly Muslim and industrial. But from the perspective of recent history the two nations have much in common.
Israel is a country of Jews expelled from eastern and central Europe,
Russia and countries in the Middle East. The Turks are descended from
Ottoman Muslims expelled from southeastern Europe and Russia as well as
native Anatolians. In both nations, religion – though not necessarily
its practice – is central to national identity. Moreover, religion
plays an important role in party politics in both countries.
Both countries are made of immigrants. Among these immigrants were
Turks but also Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Hungarian Muslims, Tatars,
Circassians, and Georgians. Once in Anatolia, having been persecuted
due to their religion, the surviving Ottoman Turkish Muslims unified
around a common Turkish-Islamic identity.
In both countries, religion's role in shaping national identity has
been tempered by secularism. Israel's first premier David Ben-Gurion's
vision was to create a Western secular Jewish identity that would bind
Jews together. In this regard, practicing Judaism was not a
prerequisite. For instance, Ben-Gurion viewed the Bible as a cultural
and historical work, not as a religious codex. Yet the fact that Israel
was envisioned as a state to which Jews would be welcome based on their
religious identity ultimately placed limitations on secularism.
In Turkey, after Ataturk established a secular state in the 1920s,
while Islam remained a major vehicle for Turkish identity, religious
practice per se became less important in daily life for many.
Both countries have internal divisions. Israel's founders were mostly
of European origin. Relatively higher levels of literacy and
socioeconomic development – and the fact that the Ashkenazi Jews came
to the country in large numbers ahead of the Sephardi Jews (of Arab
origin) – kept the Ashkenazim Israel's elite well into the 1980s.
Turkey too, had a similar dichotomy. From the beginning, Turks and
other Muslims from the more prosperous parts of the Ottoman Empire in
Europe – who had traditionally dominated the Ottoman state – enjoyed a
head start over Anatolian Muslims. The founding cadres of the republic,
including Ataturk himself, born in Salonika, hailed mostly from Europe
and Russia. And they formed Turkey's ruling elite well into the 1960s.
Recent Election:
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Reconciliation Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) swept to victory in Turkey's parliamentary elections on November 3, 2002. More than two years later, the Islamic-oriented party finds itself more popular than ever. The AKP came to power on the strength of its image as fresh and honest amid a sea of corrupt establishment parties.
AKP's victory marked the first time that any party had won an absolute
majority in Turkey's parliament since 1983 when Turgut Özal's
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) took 211 seats of the then 400-seat
parliament, and only the second time that Islamists took the reins of
government. Never before had an Islamist government won such a
substantial block in parliament, though. They won 35% of the popular
vote but technical reasons and the peculiar party voting
structure resulted in their overwhelming parliamentary margin.
Where goes the AKP? Is Erdogan's party a threat to Turkish secularism,
or the product of it? Does the AKP represent an Islamist Trojan horse,
or the benign Islamic equivalent of Europe's numerous Christian
Democrat political parties? Ergogan stated Secularism is the protector
of all beliefs and religions. We are the guarantors of this secularism,
and our management will clearly prove that.
Israel-Turkish relations:
Bilateral trade between the countries was estimated at $1.2 billion in 2002, and Turkey has bought $3 billion of Israeli weapons since 1996. Turkey is also a top foreign vacation destination, visited by some 300,000 Israelis a year.
Ankara began freezing Israeli firms out of future contracts for
military hardware such as helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles
beginning in 2003. The officially supplied explanation is that this is
necessary to bolster domestic industries. It is also probably intended
to attract European firms as well, as part of an effort to curry
Europe's favor. In addition, Ankara briefly recalled its ambassador for
"consultations" in May 2004. Israel's deputy prime minister was also
snubbed last month when he attempted to meet with Turkish Prime
Minister Erdogan.
A maelstrom of controversy erupted in June 2004 over reports that
Israel has been in league with Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and
training Kurdish militias, reports that the Israeli leadership has
repeatedly denied. If the recent reports are accurate, the Israeli
government may be nurturing relations with the Kurds in order to pursue
its geopolitical security interests and counter a number of potential
threats to its regional power.
The two countries are jointly stronger militarily than any regional
rival or potentially rival regional alliance. It is a relationship
between two "status quo powers," pooling resources to ward off common
threats and concerned mainly with preventing forcible disruptions of
the prevailing geopolitical conditions in the region. Neither Israel
nor Turkey has any active territorial claims beyond their existing
frontiers or any aspirations to topple incumbent regional regimes. But
they both face common "revisionist" adversaries - Syria, Iraq, and Iran
- which do harbor territorial ambitions or aspire either to
control or replace regimes in the region not to their liking.
On May 2, 2005 Tayyip Erdegan visited Israel and signed military
agreements as in the past. These ties are based on a renewal of a
strategic partnership developed at the end of the Cold War and rooted
in a common strategic agenda.
Under AKP rule Turkey did not cancel its contract to upgrade M-60
tanks, despite campaign promises to do so but did not negotiate new
ones.
Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister of the AKP government, visited Israel in January 2005 – after several postponements – refuting rumors of a crisis in bilateral relations. Justice Minister Cemil Cicek paid an important, symbolic visit in March 2005 when he attended the opening of the new Yad Vashem museum in Jerusalem.
Turkey selected an Israeli consortium for the Heron Unmanned Air
Vehicles project, estimated to be worth $200 million. In addition,
military exercises continued as planned, and have been held in January
2005.
Those visits helped mend fences after a chilly period marked by
Erdogan's harsh criticism of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's security
policies toward the Palestinians in the spring of 2004.
Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to Jerusalem in May 2005 makes clear
that business is as usual. Erdogan's visit reflects a Turkish
understanding that the Middle East is still an unruly neighborhood,
where Turkey needs friends such as Israel. The visit also reflects a
Turkish assessment that attempts to improve relations with Iran have
been only partially successful and that Teheran's nuclear program
constitutes a security threat to Ankara.
European Union:
Erdogan has taken a slower, steadier path, careful not to rock the establishment too quickly while at the same time floating an occasional trial balloon for social reforms to advance the Islamist agenda. While Erbakan sought to eschew the EU, Erdogan has embraced it. This has strengthened the AKP's position within Turkish society not only because many Turks believe their future lies with Europe, but also because the EU's pressure for reforms in Turkey has eroded the power of the army, the traditional nemesis of political Islam in Turkey.
On the surface, Turkey is doing well. After years of devaluation, its
currency is stable. Inflation is under control. As host of the June
2004 NATO summit, Turkey shone diplomatically. Earlier that same month,
the Organization of Islamic Conference elected a Turkish professor as
its new head. Turkish diplomats say their chance for joining the
European Union has never been better.
The prospect of EU membership also spurred reassessment of Turkish
foreign policy. Turkey's secular foreign policy elite is European at
heart. Almost all Turkish diplomats are educated either in Europe, or
at European schools in Turkey. They share Atatürk's European
Weltanschauung and feel relieved to move beyond Turkey's traditional
tensions with Europe and to reinforce a pro-European stance. The new
pro-EU orientation of Turkish foreign policy became more pronounced
after the December 2002 Copenhagen summit, when Brussels—again after
U.S. lobbying—agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey as soon
as Ankara satisfied the Copenhagen criteria.
The Iraqi war exacerbated the process, reviving dormant political
forces and anti-Americanism. Months before the start of the 2003 Iraq
war, Turkish statements mirrored Franco-German rhetoric in its
insistence that the war "lacked international legitimacy."
One potential U.S.-Turkey problem is Iraq. The dream of independence or
close to it via a single Kurdish state, may come true for the Kurds of
Iraq -- making Kirkuk an official part of Northern Kurdistan -- is a
bad dream for the Turkish government. From Ankara's perspective the
creation of a Kurdish state in their northern neighbor with Kirkuk as
its capital would serve as a magnet for Turkey's own Kurdish population
which may be between 6-10 million persons. (The number of Kurds in any
of the countries is very difficult to know since they are fearful of
census takers.)
While Turkey relations with Iraq may be at the mercy of forces beyond
its control, its military power is anchoring its strategy to the
political process in Baghdad and, as part of that, a peaceful solution
to the Kirkuk question. However public pressures resulting from
Ankara's manipulation of the Iraqi Turkoman question and the limited
but existent deployment of Turkish troops on Iraqi soil could create a
dynamic of their own, possibly precipitating military intervention over
Kirkuk. Turkey interest to obtaining membership in the EU may mellow
their concern about the Kurds. In addition they may consider as
positive the potential use of the oil in Kirkuk.
Until recently EU membership seemed likely in a decade. With the recent
EU constitutional crisis Turkish membership has certainly been
postponed if not scratched. The new Pope understanding of the EU
as a Christian club will not help.
Is this likely to make Turkey more friendly to the U.S. Zeynel Erdem, a
leading Turkish businessman, said in the last several weeks “Don't
count on the European Union, Look to the U.S.; they're our real
friends."
When Samuel Huntington visited Turkey in late 2004 he suggested that
Turkey forget about the EU and concentrate on being part of the Middle
East. While the U.S. has been favorable to Turkey joining the EU if
that fails the U.S. would not be unfavorable to a stable, militarily
sound and democratic Turkey becoming a better partner in the Middle
East.